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In June 2016, the UK held a referendum on EU membership; 52% of those who voted, voted 
to leave, and 48% voted to remain. During the referendum campaign two identities emerged: 
‘Brexiter’ and ‘Remainer’, which remained salient post-referendum. This study explores how 
the categories of Brexiter and Remainer were deployed by posters online. Data comprises 
comment threads collected from four online newspapers both during the campaign and after 
the vote, which focus on the Brexit campaign promise: ‘We send £350m a week to the EU. 
Let’s fund our NHS instead’. We draw on membership categorisation analysis and discursive 
psychology to analyse when categories were made salient and what responses to the 
invocation of categories were. Analysis revealed that posters explicitly categorise 
theoutgroup and in doing so implicitly define their group. Posters resisted other political 
identities when attributed to them in relation to the referendum. The analysis shows how 
Brexiter and Remainer are new, albeit contested, political categories and identities in their 
own right, with other political identities resisted when used.  The paper highlights 
implications for the political system in the UK and for social divisions within UK society.   
 
Introduction 
1. Brexit  
The referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was held in June 2016, after an extensive 
period of campaigning by the formal campaign groups; supported by other political, 
industrial and civil society stakeholders. Over 45 million people voted, with a turnout of 72% 
which was the highest turnout for any vote in over 20 years in the UK. The final result (52% 
leave and 48% remain) highlighted a stark political division in the country, which still 
resonates as the UK negotiates leaving the EU.  
The campaign was incredibly bitter at times, with Moore and Ramsey (2017) suggesting 
that it was the “most divisive, hostile, negative and fear-provoking of the 21st Century” (n.p). 
While this is arguable, it is true that some campaign claims were viciously contested. A key 
slogan, which we focus on in this paper, was ‘We send £350m a week to the EU. Let’s fund 
our NHS instead’. This claim was contested throughout the campaign and after the 
referendum as “it became evident that health care underfunding had very little to do with the 
European Union” (Costa-Font, 2017, p.783), and the costs of leaving the EU became evident 
(Begg, 2017).  
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During the campaign, the terms ‘Brexiter’ and ‘Remainer’ emerged to describe those who 
would vote leave or remain. Although taking a pro or anti-EU stance is not new (see, for 
example, Forster, 2002 for a discussion of the history of Euroscepticism), in the case of the 
EU referendum, these identities became particularly salient in political discourse in the UK.  
 
2. Political identities and groups 
Social identity theorists argue that ‘social identity’ underpins the ways in which groups 
behave (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979); that is, a group’s norms and behaviour will influence 
the norms and behaviour of individuals who identify with that group. Individuals who 
identify as part of an ‘ingroup’ evaluate themselves positively compared to relevant 
‘outgroups’ (Hornsey, 2008). However, social identity theory struggles to address how we 
come to identify with particular groups. Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) understands categorization as a psychological, cognitive 
process which then has an influence on our thoughts and behaviour (Edwards, 1998). It also 
suggests that we organize people into categories because this is how the ‘real-world’ 
functions. A particular category will become salient depending on the situation, including 
what comparisons can be made between particular groups, and what we expect the 
similarities and differences between individuals to be (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010).  
 Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that categories are not simply mental processes 
which are ‘switched on’ by particular events. Instead, categories are understood as practices 
which are deployed in interaction to manage interactional business (Edwards, 1998). 
Category use in interaction is “locally constructed, occasioned and rhetorically oriented in 
nature” (Edwards, 1998 p.30).  Self-categorizations are not fixed but dynamic and fluid, even 
within a single interaction; and they are ‘worked up’ by those in the interaction (Antaki, 
Condor & Levine, 1996). We should not, therefore, understand categories as a fixed identity 
for any individual, but as constituting a range of interactional resources (Rapley, McCarthy & 
McHoul, 2003).  
Previous research has aimed to understand how political categories and identities are 
discursively constructed. This research avoids approaching categories as merely mental 
representations, but instead focuses on categories as they are used in situ, and how categories 
are built up rhetorically through talk.  A variety of topics, such as racism (Rapley, 1998), 
extremism (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009), prejudice (Tileaga, 2006) and politicians’ 
self-categories (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) have been addressed, with the aim of exploring 
how these concepts are constructed through discursive practices. Research in this area aims to 
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use naturally-occurring data; that is, it focuses on language as it occurs in practice, without 
intervention from the researcher (Potter, 2004).   
  
3. The internet as a site of political discourse 
Social media has had an impact on how politicians campaign, and the referendum campaign 
was no different, with both Leave and Remain campaigns active on Twitter. During the 
referendum campaign Brexiters were more prominent on Twitter throughout most of the 
campaign, but in later stages, pro-Remain tweets became more frequent (Llewellyn & Cram, 
2016). One site of much debate during the referendum campaign which, to our knowledge, 
has not yet been studied is online newspaper comments, which afford opportunities for 
ordinary people to engage in political discourse.   
Many online newspapers allow comments below news or opinion articles, where any 
reader is able to respond to the article. In an online setting there can be multiple potential 
recipients: a direct recipient of a post; an indirect recipient who is part of the interaction but 
not the direct recipient of a message; and overhearing recipients, who are not ‘ratified’ 
participants in the interaction, but view the messages anyway (Goffman, 1981; Meredith, 
2016). Online data has a number of perceived limitations for researchers, such as the inability 
to request clarification from participants, and the anonymity the online forum permits for its 
users (Jowett, 2015). However, these limitations are irrelevant for critical discursive research 
as it focuses only on what is posted, rather than on the motivations or veracity or otherwise of 
posts (Jowett, 2015). Using data from online sources allows for the analysis of how 
individuals discuss particular topics in a ‘naturalistic’ way, with no researcher influence on 
their interaction (Potter & Hepburn, 2005).  As such, there has been a growing body of 
research which uses online data to study how ‘identity work’ is done online (e.g., Sneijder & 
te Molder, 2009; Horne & Wiggins, 2009; Coles & West, 2016).    
This paper focuses on the new political identities of Brexiter and Remainer. Although 
these categories are used widely in the media, little is known about what these terms mean to 
those who use them in ordinary interaction, or how they relate to other political identities. 
Therefore, this paper examines the construction of these categories as they are constructed in 
and through online interaction as salient political identities.  
 
Methods 
1 Data collection 
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Four national newspaper websites were chosen, both tabloids and broadsheets, including both 
pro and anti-EU newspapers. The newspaper websites allowed comments on their news 
stories and were not behind a paywall so were considered to be in the public domain. The 
four newspaper sites chosen were: Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday; The Independent; The 
Guardian/The Observer; and The Express/Sunday Express. Of these, the Independent, Mail 
on Sunday and the Guardian/Observer backed remaining in the EU. The Express, Sunday 
Express and Daily Mail supported leaving the EU.  
As the £350 million claim was so prominently contested (Corbett, 2016), we chose to 
focus on news items which related to this claim. Data collection took place in October 2016.  
We used the search terms ‘NHS’, ‘£350m’, ‘Brexit’, ‘EU’, and searched for any stories which 
related to the £350 million claim since the referendum was announced in February 2016, 
meaning that stories from before and after the vote were captured in the sample. We excluded 
any articles which did not relate directly to Brexit, live blogs which covered daily events in 
the campaign, and any items which did not allow comments. In total, we have a corpus of 34 
newspaper items (see Appendix 1). The focus of our analysis was the comments not the 
newspaper items themselves. We sampled threads (a collection of posts, generally related to 
the same topic) rather than individual posts, as the interaction between posters is of analytic 
importance. In order to ensure relatively even representation from all newspapers, whilst 
maintaining a manageable data set, we chose to limit the number of threads sampled for each 
item to 100. This gave us a dataset of 2586 threads, comprising a total of 192661 words, 
inclusive of user name, which included a range of comments and views from across the 
newspapers, enabling us to attain saturation (Braun & Clarke, 2006). We used NVivo to 
collect the data, and then transferred it to Microsoft Word so it would be searchable. In 
accordance with the University of Salford ethics committee approval, and guided by the 
British Psychological Society guidelines for internet mediated research (BPS, 2017), we 
anonymised all posts by giving posters a pseudonym.  
 
2 Analytic approach 
We draw on discursive psychology (DP; Edwards & Potter, 1992) and membership 
categorisation analysis (MCA; Sacks, 1992) in our analysis.  DP avoids treating language as a 
system of rules and categories, but rather conceives of talk “as a domain of situated action, 
rather than a set of conventions for the expression of intended messages” (Edwards, 2004, 
p.41). DP aims to identify shared normative practices that organize social interaction 
(Augoustinos & Tileaga, 2012) and to identify “the social and political consequences of 
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discursive patterning” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 405).  DP also draws on MCA in its work and has 
a similar interest in how categories are built up in talk (e.g., Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; 
Edwards, 1998). MCA aims to identify how categories are used in talk and provides a way 
for analysts to study categories as members’ concerns (Stokoe, 2012). Collections of 
particular uses of categories are built and then explored to see how categories are located 
within an interaction or text. MCA analyses the design and action orientation of the turn or 
text and “look(s) for evidence that and how recipients orient to the category” (Stokoe, 2012, 
p.280).  
We manually collected all instances of the categories of Brexiter and Remainer along 
with any related terms (such as ‘Remoaner’ or ‘Brexiteer’). We created collections of where 
these terms were used explicitly (e.g., ‘the usual vapid comment from a Brexiter’), but also 
where the category characteristics were used to make these terms implicitly relevant (e.g., 
‘the idiots voted out’) and where they were used alongside other political identities, such as 
political parties or positions. We examined each of these collections for how the categories 
were explicitly defined, which predicates were used implicitly, and how these categories were 
used and responded to.  
 
Analysis 
The analysis is divided into two sections: 1) Definitions of Brexiter and Remainer; 2) the use 
of other political categories. In the first section, we discuss the discourses which were used in 
relation to each of the categories, as well as providing more detailed analysis of typical posts. 
In the second section we demonstrate how existing political identities are resisted when 
discussing Brexit.    
 
1. Definitions of Brexiter and Remainer 
Across the data the categories of Brexiter and Remainer were often defined by the opposing 
group. Discourses used to describe the category of Brexiters relate to a lack of intelligence 
(‘basic reading comprehension is what leavers lack – along with IQ’ Article 23), gullibility 
(‘one gullible Brexiter from Sunderland’ Article 23) and general ignorance of the issues 
involved in the vote (‘you simply cannot argue with this level of ignorance’ Article 16).  
Brexiters were also described as focused on immigration (‘it is all about immigration now’ 
Article 16) as well as in terms of other categories, in particular their age. The following 
extract provides an example of a typical post that linked category predicates and an age 




Extract 1: Article 4 
Weisemann44  > YeOldeBludgen  
1  You have to remember that when you deal with Brexiers you are dealing with  
2  fanatics who cannot accept reason and with feeble minded elderly people  
3  who will vote for anybody who promises them to move the country back to  
4  1933. 
 
In this post, Weisemann44 is providing a direct response to a question posted earlier in the 
thread by YeOldeBludgen (denoted by the > between the two posters’ names) which asked 
how Brexiters could believe that the EU is a greater threat to the NHS than the Conservative 
party. Weisemann44 provides an explicit definition of what the characteristics or predicates 
are of a person who belongs to the category of ‘Brexiter’.  Brexiters are ‘fanatics’ (line 2), 
which implies they are obsessive and irrational. They are also described as being unable to 
‘accept reason’, which suggests that reasonable arguments are being made, but Brexiters 
simply cannot accept them. This post, therefore, fits within the broader discourses found in 
our dataset of Brexiters being unintelligent, ignorant and gullible (see also Corbett, 2016).   
The categories of Brexiter and Remainer are part of a membership categorization 
device (MCD) ‘voters in the referendum’. MCDs are collections of categories which are 
heard together; for example, mother, daughter, sister are categories of the MCD ‘family’ 
(Stokoe, 2012). Brexiter and Remainer are also a standardized relational pair, in that they sit 
together in a paired relationship (Stokoe, 2003). As these categories are related, the category 
of Remainer is also implicitly defined when the category of ‘Brexiter’ is and vice versa 
(Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004). Therefore, when Weisemann44 attributes the 
predicate of ‘being unreasonable’ to Brexiters, this implicitly defines Remainers as being 
reasonable.  
   Brexiters are also defined as ‘feeble minded elderly people’, which constructs the 
category of Brexiter as being related to an age category, providing for multiple potential 
inferences depending on the context (Stokoe, 2009). However, the poster goes on to provide 
the exact inferences which any recipient should understand from the use of this category: that 
they want to ‘move the country back to 1933’. This categorizes Brexiters as old fashioned, 
nostalgic and backward thinking (see Cobley, 2018)  and can also be understood as part of 
the broader discourse found in our data of Brexiters being gullible.   
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We have, then, two groups of people categorized as ‘Brexiters’: those who are 
fanatical and unreasonable, and those who are feeble-minded and elderly. Categories are 
recurrently used and treated as inference-rich as “a great deal of the knowledge that members 
of a society have about the society is stored in terms of these categories” (Sacks, 1992, p. 90). 
We can use categories such as ‘mother’, ‘daughter’, ‘wife’ and so on to describe a ‘woman’ 
without having to explicitly define what the associated predicates of that category are 
(Stokoe, 2012). Where the predicates of a category are explicitly defined, as is the case in this 
extract, we would argue that the posters are treating these categories as emergent and 
therefore not ‘inference-rich’ (Sacks, 1992).  
These discourses and examples demonstrate that Remainers tend to define Brexiters 
in wholly negative ways (see also Carl, 2018). However, in cases where Brexiters defined 
their own category predicates or characteristics these included more positive characteristics 
such as being ‘proud to support freedom’ (Article 28) and being ‘supporters of democracy’ 
(Article 19). As previously noted, Brexiters’ self-definitions also comprise implicit 
definitions of characteristics they perceive Remainers as not having.  
 Remainers were also explicitly defined by Brexiters. The discourses used in relation 
to Remainers related to how they were weak and ‘swayed by those with a special agenda’ 
(Article 12). They were also defined as out of touch with reality (‘the remainers should really 
now get back in touch with reality’ Article 23) or as ‘celebrity luvvies’ (Article 17). 
Considering that newspapers dubbed the Remain campaign ‘Project Fear’ (Green, 2016) it 
was perhaps unsurprising that Remainers were also seem as ‘scaremongers’ (Article 12) who 
were exaggerating the potential downsides of Brexit. As with Brexiters, being an incumbent 
of the category Remainer was seen as negative, when defined by the outgroup.  
There were some discourses which were used in relation to both groups. Remainers 
were defined by Brexiters as being unintelligent (‘one cell remoaners’ Article 23), and there 
were often exchanges in the threads about which side could be defined as ‘liars’ (‘but then, I 
don’t expect honestly from Brexiteers’ Article 23). The following extract demonstrates how 
Remainers were explicitly defined as liars during one exchange.   
 
Extract 2: Article 28 
Neyra 
[…] 
1  The entire remain campaign was formulated and built on nothing but lies. 
2  ALL of it! 
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3  I have asked frustraded [sic] remainers to name any other lie than the 350 million 
4  figure misinterpretation. They can't. Yet they wilfully ignore the dozens and  
5  dozens of blatant lies by the remain campaign.  Remainers have shown 
6  themselves to be fantasists, delusional idiots, xenophobic bigots and  
7  hypocrites 
 8 Brexit told the truth. Brexit won, GET OVER IT! 
 
Neyra’s post (the final part of which is produced here, for reasons of space) focuses on 
whether the £350m claim was a lie. Neyra’s post suggests that a category-bound activity 
(Sacks, 1992) of being a Remainer is ignoring the ‘blatant lies’ of the Remain campaign (line 
5). Neyra’s invoking of this activity as relevant to Remainers functions to resist the category-
bound predicate of Brexiters being liars. Billig (1991) notes that any attitude taken towards 
any particular position is also implicitly a stance against the counter-position. Therefore, 
when Neyra downgrades the term ‘lie’ to ‘350 million figure misinterpretation’ (line 3-4) 
they are implicitly denying the position that the £350 million claim was a ‘lie’.  They are also 
potentially denying this claim through attacking the credibility of their opponents (Byford, 
2006); in other words, attributing particular characteristics to Remainers demonstrates they 
cannot be trusted and are engaged in lying or untruths.   
The post then lists the predicates which Neyra attributes to Remainers (lines 6 and 7). 
Through using the phrase ‘have shown themselves’ Neyra implies that these predicates have 
been established through the actions of Remainers, although these activities are for recipients 
to infer. The list of terms that Neyra uses are, in some cases, over-defined; for example, 
‘xenophobic bigots’ potentially describes the same predicate with similar words. The list 
construction suggests a completeness and comprehensiveness of the definition (Rapley, 
1998). Neyra’s final line refers to Brexit rather than Brexiters, suggesting that this is not 
about particular individuals but about the campaign as a whole. This is a three-part list 
(Jefferson, 1990), with the final part potentially aimed at overhearing recipients (and 
particularly Remainers) who have complained about the outcome. This highlights that the 
post potentially aims to mobilise support for their political position (Reicher & Hopkins, 
1996).  
 In summary, the predicates of the categories Brexiter and Remainer are often made 
explicit, whether through self-defining or through implicitly defining the ingroup through the 
definition of the outgroup.  Based on the general discourses used we can see that the 
predicates for the outgroup tend to be defined in negative terms on both sides, which may 
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have social consequences in terms of entrenching social divisions in society (Corbett, 2016) 
These are emerging categories, with the potential inferences which could be associated with 
those categories yet to be established, and so posters define them. However, as similar 
predicates are used for both Brexiters and Remainers (e.g., liars, unintelligent) it can be seen 
that the precise nature of these categories is contested.  
 
2. Use of other political categories  
Posters used other political categories, which were treated by posters as inference-rich and so 
not needing explicit definition, as synonyms for the categories of Brexiter and Remainer.  
 
Extract 3: Article 23 
BigBirdPrey 
1 The idiots voted out even though they didn't have a clue and the alleged  
2 ‘benefits' of leaving were all lies. 
Sam Lock 
3  17.4m people - the most Britons who have every voted for anything - are  
4  'idiots', are we?  
5  But thanks anyway. The endless stream of sneering supercilious down-your 
6  -nose put-downs from you lefties helped us win on 23rd June. 
Alpha1025 
7   why are you stupidly assuming he's a leftie? not all Remain voters  
8   where left of Centre, there where [sic] plenty of Tory voters who voted 
to  
9   Remain as well 
 
In this post, the categories of Brexiter and Remainer are not used explicitly but are implied 
through the category-bound activities of ‘voted out’ (line 1) and ‘voted to Remain’ (lines 8-
9). However, other political categories are used. Sam states that put-down from ‘lefties’ 
helped ‘us’ win (line 6). The category of ‘leftie’ can be heard as being from the MCD of 
‘place on the political spectrum’, along with other terms such as ‘right-winger’, ‘centrist’ and 
so on. This term is treated by the posters as a ‘pre-existing’ category, which is not in need of 
any definition, as it is presumably already ‘inference-rich’. Sam’s post, though, uses the term 
‘us’ as contrastive to ‘lefties’, suggesting that ‘lefties’ can be understood as synonymous with 
Remainers. Alpha dismisses this use of the category ‘leftie’ because it is not the most relevant 
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or salient category in this context (Widdicombe, 1998). Alpha provides a basis for their 
rejection of the category by claiming ‘not all Remain voters were left of Centre’ invoking 
voter political affiliations, constructed as ‘common-knowledge’ (Potter, 1996). Thus, political 
party categories are rejected on the basis that this MCD is not relevant in this situation.  
In the following post we see the introduction of a new category, ‘Remoaner’. Post-
referendum, this category emerged in our data as a pejorative term to mean someone who 
voted ‘remain’ and is still vocally opposed to Brexit. In this extract, the use of the term 
Remoaner is contested. 
 
Extract 4: Article 31 
Booted58 
1 So, if remoaners are saving up their "i told u so" 
2 Can I state that in 2008 all the apparent due consequences of leaving the EU have  
3 already happened and can i confirm that this was all your faults? 
Foxhound 
4  What the h@ll is a "remoaner"? Another made up word for the unintelligent  
5  no doubt. 
   Bruce June 
6   That's you that is! 
   PhiPho 
7     I prefer remainiac to remoaner to be honest, but both fit the  
8    bill... 
Busclebend 
9     I prefer leftist Remainiac. 
     Bantags 
10      Leftist? ... and yet 62% of Labour voters backed  
11      Remain! 
 
In line 1 the term ‘remoaner’ is used alongside a category predicate of being the type of 
person who would say ‘I told you so’. It is not, though, the category predicate which is 
resisted here but the use of the term itself (line 4). Foxhound formulates the term ‘remoaner’ 
as a made-up term, highlighted by the quotation marks. They also explicitly categorise 
anyone who uses the term (including the original poster) as unintelligent (line 4).   
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In the rest of the thread, the posters draw attention to the emergent status of this 
category through debating the merits of categorizing in one way or another (Billig, 1996), and 
discussing what the appropriate or correct term is. In line 9 Busclebend includes the category 
of left-wing, which is then resisted by Bantags. In Bantags’ post it is the term ‘leftie’ rather 
than the term ‘Remaniac’ which is now being resisted. We argue that at this point in the 
interaction, ‘leftist’ is resisted because it is not the most salient category here, whereas 
‘Remainiac’ is at least salient in the interaction. Bantags provides evidence to support their 
argument that ‘leftist’ is not the most salient category, yet even here they switch from the 
MCD of ‘political spectrum’ to ‘political party’. 
In summary, posters resisted the use of other MCDs such as political spectrum or 
political party as these were not the most salient identity categories to be used. The analysis 
presented here suggests that the categories of Brexiter and Remainer/Remoaner are treated as 
new political identities in their own right.  
 
Discussion  
Our analysis has demonstrated how the categories of Brexiter and Remainer are used, 
defined and resisted in online comment threads.  These categories do not simply refer to how 
someone voted but also include inferences and definitions about the type of person someone 
identifying with, or being identified with, that category might be. As expected based on social 
identity theory, members of ingroups defined themselves positively compared to outgroups 
(Hornsey, 1998). In defining the outgroup in a negative way, posters were also implicitly 
defining their own group, meaning that it could be inferred that their characteristics were 
positive. Our analysis also showed that traditional political categories were resisted and 
challenged when used as synonyms for Brexiter and Remainer.  
Our findings have implications for the organization of political identities and the party 
political system in the UK. While some research has suggested that the divisions that have 
arisen around Brexit are emblematic of pre-existing divisions (Corbett, 2016; Ford & 
Goodwin, 2017), our data suggest that participants in these interactions treat the categories of 
Brexiter and Remainer as new identities, which are in need of definition, and which have 
become salient because of the situation (Reicher et al., 2010). Other political categories (e.g., 
Leftie, Tory, Labour) are not salient identities in these discussions, and their use is resisted by 
recipients. The traditional political dividing lines of left and right, Conservative and Labour 
are now cross-cut by the division of Brexiter and Remainer and this may lead to the 
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subsequent re-shaping of the party system in the UK in years to come (see Ford and 
Goodwin, 2017).    
As well as the implications for the political system, the analysis has shown how toxic 
and divisive the discourses used around Brexit, Brexiters and Remainers are. As the nation 
moves forward with Brexit, there will be a need to manage these societal divisions. And yet, 
as our data has shown, Remainers often dismiss those who voted Leave as being uneducated, 
elderly, ignorant, or obsessed with immigration. Similarly, Brexiters see those who voted to 
remain as being part of the establishment, anti-democracy and anti-freedom. With these 
increasingly stereotypical views of the outgroup emerging, it seems that finding ways to 
bridge the societal divisions that Brexit appears to have opened, may pose as many 
challenges as Brexit itself.  
 Finally, our article has demonstrated the usefulness of using online data for analysing 
emergent categories. In using newspaper data we, firstly, have access to a ready-made archive 
which can be collected relatively easily and which can show how categories are used in situ. 
Secondly, this data is naturally-occurring (Potter, 2004), and so it is more ecologically valid.  
Studying naturally-occurring interaction using discursive methods allows us insight into how 
ordinary people use identity categories, develop arguments, demonstrate their own 
knowledge and challenge others in everyday interaction.  Through analysing this data in-
depth, we can see how small details may give us an insight into broader issues (Sacks, 1984). 
Thirdly, as the internet is where so much political debate around Brexit took place (Seaton, 
2016), using data from online sources allows researchers to explore the many different facets 
of ordinary people’s understandings of Brexit, and also of politics in general.  
There are some limitations of our study. Firstly, we did not collect data from the 
earliest point when the terms Brexiter or Remainer were being used, so we did not see the 
origins of these terms. Secondly, we have not, at this stage, examined the differences between 
newspapers in how these categories are defined. Future research could seek to address these 
limitations. Finally, as the focus of our data was a contested claim, it may have meant that 
users focused much more on specific category predicates or activities, such as lying, because 
of the nature of the original news story.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has offered an in-depth analysis of the categories of Brexiter and Remainer as 
used in online newspaper comment threads. The use of discursive methods has allowed for an 
in-depth analysis, which has demonstrated how micro-level interactions illuminate broader 
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societal concerns.  The analysis has shown how each group was defined by the other in a 
negative way, which demonstrates the challenges involved in finding a way to heal the rifts 
bought to light by the referendum. The analysis has also demonstrated how the use of pre-
existing political identities, such as political parties, was resisted and challenged by posters as 
not being salient identities. These findings highlight how the political system in the UK will 
need to adapt to find ways to manage this new cross-cutting division.  
 
References 
Antaki, C., Condor, S., & Levine, M. (1996). Social identities in talk: Speakers’ own 
orientations. British Journal of Social Psychology, 35(4), 473-492.  
Antaki, C., & Widdicombe, S. (Eds.). (1998). Identities in talk. London: Sage. 
Augoustinos, M., & Tileagă, C. (2012). Twenty five years of discursive psychology. British 
Journal of Social Psychology, 51(3), 405-412. 
Billig, M. (1991). Ideology and opinions: Studies in rhetorical psychology. London: Sage. 
Billig, M. (1996). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Begg, I. (2017, October 20). The gaffe that keeps on taking: How to break the deadlock over 
Britain’s EU divorce bill [blog]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/10/20/the-gaffe-that-keeps-on-taking-how-to-
break-the-deadlock-over-britains-eu-divorce-bill/ 
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research  
in Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 
British Psychological Society. (2017). Ethics Guidelines for Internet-mediated Research. 
INF206/04.2017. Leicester: Author. Available from: https://www.bps.org.uk/news-
and-policy/ethics-guidelines-internet-mediated-research-2017 
Byford, J. (2006). ‘Serbs never hated the Jews’: The denial of antisemitism in Serbian 
Orthodox Christian culture. Patterns of Prejudice, 40(02), 159-180. 
Carl, N. (2018, May 4). Leavers have a better understanding of Remainers’ motivations than 
vice versa [blog]. Retrieved from http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/05/04/leavers-
have-a-better-understanding-of-remainers-motivations-than-vice-versa/.  
Cobley, B. (2018, July 19). The role of identity politics in the Remainer Revolt [blog]. 
Retrieved from https://briefingsforbrexit.com/the-role-of-identity-politics-in-the-
remainer-revolt-by-ben-cobley/.   
15 
 
Coles, B.A., & West, M. (2016). Trolling the trolls: Online forum users’ constructions of the 
nature and properties of trolling. Computers in Human Behaviour, 60, 233-244/  
Corbett, S. (2016. The social consequences of Brexit for the UK and Europe: Euroscepticism, 
populism, nationalism and societal division. International Journal of Social Quality, 
6(1), 11-31.  
Costa-Font, J. (2017). The National Health Service at a critical moment: When Brexit means 
hectic. Journal of Social Policy, 46(4), 783-795.  
Edwards, D. (1998). The relevant thing about her: Social identity categories in use. In C. 
Antaki & S. Widdicombe (eds). Identities in talk. (pp.15-33). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications.  
Edwards, D. (2004). Shared knowledge as a performative category in conversation. Rivista Di 
Psicololinguistica Applicata, 4(2-3), 41-53. 
Edwards D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology. London: Sage 
Ford, R., & Goodwin, M. (2017). Britain after Brexit: A nation divided. Journal of 
Democracy, 28, 17-30.  
Forster, A. (2002). Euroscepticism in contemporary British politics: Opposition to Europe in 
the British Conservative and Labour parties since 1945. New York: Taylor & Francis 
Goffman, E. (1981). Forms of talk. University of Pennsylvania Press.  
Green, J. (2016). What explains the failure of ‘Project Fear’? [blog post]. Retrieved from: 
https://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-8-
voters/what-explains-the-failure-of-project-fear/ 
Hopkins, N., & Kahani-Hopkins, V. (2009). Reconceptualizing extremism and moderation: 
From categories of analysis to categories of practice in the construction of collective 
identity. British Journal of Social Psychology, 48(1), 99-113. 
Horne, J., & Wiggins, S. (2009). Doing being ‘on the edge’: Managing the dilemma of being 
authentically suicidal in an online forum. Sociology of Health & Illness, 31(2), 170-
184.  
Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: A historical 
review. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2(1), 204-222. 
Jefferson, G. (1990). List construction as a task and resource. Interaction competence, 63-92. 
Jowett, A. (2015). A case for using online discussion forums in critical psychological 
research. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 12(3), 287-297.  
16 
 
Leudar, I., Marsland, V., & Nekvapil, J. (2004). On membership 
categorization:‘us’,‘them’and ‘doing violence’in political discourse. Discourse & 
Society, 15(2-3), 243-266. 
Llewellyn, C., & Cram, L. (2016, March). Brexit? Analyzing Opinion on the UK-EU 
Referendum within Twitter. In ICWSM(pp. 760-761). 
Meredith, J. (2016). Using conversation analysis and discursive psychology to analyse online 
data. In D. Silverman (ed). Qualitative Research (5th edition) (pp.261- ). London: 
Sage 
Moore, M. & Ramsey, G. (2017, May 16). Acrimonious and divisive: The role the media 
played in Brexit [blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/05/16/acrimonious-and-divisive-the-role-the-media-
played-in-brexit/ 
Potter, J. (1996). Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction. London: 
Sage.  
Potter, J. (2004). Discourse analysis as a way of analysing naturally occurring talk. In D. 
Silverman (Ed.), Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice (pp. 200-221). 
London: Sage. 
Potter, J., & Hepburn, A. (2005) Qualitative interviews in psychology: problems and 
possibilities. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 2(4), 281-307. 
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and 
behaviour. London: Sage. 
Rapley, M. (1998). ‘Just an ordinary Australian’: Self-categorization and the discursive 
construction of facticity in ‘new racist’ political rhetoric. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 37(3), 325-344.  
Rapley, M., McCarthy, D., & McHoul, A. (2003). Mentality or morality? Membership 
categorization, multiple meanings and mass murder. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 42(3), 427-444.  
Reicher, S., & Hopkins, N. (1996). Self-category constructions in political rhetoric: An 
analysis of Thatcher’s and Kinnock’s speeches concerning the British miners’ strike 
(1984-5). European Journal of Social Psychology, 26(3), 353-371.  
Reicher, S., Spears, R., & Haslam, S.A. (2010). The social identity approach in social 
psychology.  In M. Wetherell and C.T. Mohanty (eds). The SAGE handbook of 
identities. (pp. 45-62). London: Sage Publications.  
Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In J. M. Atkinson, & J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures 
17 
 
of social action: Studies in conversation analysis (pp. 21-27). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on conversation (Vols 1 and 2, edited by Gail Jefferson). Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
Seaton, J. (2016). Brexit and the media. The Political Quarterly, 87(3), 333-337.    
Sneijder, P., & te Molder, H. (2009). Normalizing ideological food choice and eating 
practices. Identity work in online discussions on veganism. Appetite, 52(3), 621-630. 
Stokoe, E. H. (2003). Mothers, single women and sluts: Gender, morality and membership 
categorization in neighbour disputes. Feminism & psychology, 13(3), 317-344. 
Stokoe, E. (2009). Doing actions with identity categories: Complaints and denials in neighbor 
disputes. Text & Talk, 29(1), 75-97. 
Stokoe, E. (2012). Moving forward with membership categorization analysis: Methods for 
systematic analysis. Discourse Studies, 14(3), 277-303. 
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J.C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The social 
psychology of intergroup relations, 33(47), 74.  
Tileaga, C. (2006). Representing the ‘other’: A discursive analysis of prejudice and moral 
exclusion in talk about Romanies. Journal of Community & Applied Social 
Psychology, 16(1), 19-41.  
Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D., & Wetherell, M.S. (1987). 
Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford: Blackwell 
Wetherell, M. (1998). Positioning and interpretative repertoires: Conversation analysis and 
post-structuralism in dialogue. Discourse & Society, 9, 387-412.  
Widdicombe, S. (1998).’But you don’t class yourself’: The interactional management of 
category membership and non-membership. In C. Antaki & S. Widdicombe (Eds.). 





Appendix 1: Table of newspaper items 
Article 
Number 







1 Leaked Brexit email claims David Cameron has 'starved' NHS Guardian News article 2nd April  100 
2 Brexit won’t save the NHS – because the real threat is closer to home Guardian  Opinion 
piece 
15th April  71 
3 Boris Johnson: Cash-starved NHS will receive BILLIONS if Britain leaves the European Union Daily 
Express 
News article 15th April  57 
4 Vote Leave 'save our NHS' leaflets found on London hospital's wards Guardian  News article 15th April  100 
5 Boris Johnson accused of hypocrisy as Brexit tour bus is German Daily Mail News article 11th May  79 
6 Brexit campaign 'writing cheques they know will bounce', says Cameron Guardian  News article 4th June  100 
7 Nigel Farage: £350 million pledge to fund the NHS was a 'big mistake' Daily 
Express 
News article 4th June  30 
8 Boris & Gove call for spending increase on the NHS  Daily 
Express 
News article 4th June  22 
9 IFS slams Michael Gove's claim a Brexit would mean £8bn for NHS Daily Mail News article 6th June  100 
10 EU referendum - Respected Tory MP Sarah Wollaston quits Leave campaign over 'false' NHS 
claims 
Independent News article 9th June  53 
11 EU referendum: Sturgeon accuses Johnson of telling £350m 'whopper' Guardian News article 9th June  100 
12 Amber Rudd's jibe at Boris Johnson in nasty TV EU referendum debate Daily Mail News article 9th June  100 
13 Tory MP Sarah Wollaston switches from Leave to Remain over NHS claims Daily 
Express  
News article 9th June  89 
19 
 
14 Why Vote Leave's £350m weekly EU cost claim is wrong Guardian ‘Fact check’ 10th June  100 
15 Andrew Tyrie accuses Boris Johnson of trying to 'bribe' voters with NHS funding claims Daily Mail News article 13th June  100 
16 What would Brexit mean for the NHS, social care and disabled people? Guardian Opinion 
piece 
14th June  100 
17 Brexit campaigners should not be trusted about NHS claim top doctors Daily Mail News article 14th June  100 
18 Question Time audience member puts down Diane Abbott as she attacks Farage for NHS 'lies' Daily 
Express 
News article 22nd June  100 
19 David Cameron got the 'maximum' from his EU renegotiation Daily Mail News article 22nd June  100 
20 The biggest political decision for a generation was based on a lie about £250m - the NHS will 
never see that 
Independent Opinion 
piece 
24th June  11 
21 Video evidence emerges of Nigel Farage pledging EU millions for NHS weeks before Brexit vote Independent News article 25th June  100 
22 Brexit MEP 'rows back on claims that quitting the EU would cut immigration' Daily Mail News article 26th June  100 
23 Brexit_Vote leave camp abandon £350m-a-week NHS vows in Change Britain Plans Independent News article 27th June  60 
24 Brexit_Vote Leave camp wipes NHS £350m claim and rest of its website after EU referendum Independent News article 27th June  79 
25 Brexit_£350 million a week extra for the NHS only 'an aspiration' - says Vote Leave campaigner 
Chris Grayling 
Independent News article 27th June  11 
26 EU workers in the NHS: 'I've faced racial abuse and will head home' Guardian Reader 
contributions 
6th July  100 
27 Please let’s not send Europeans away – we need them for the NHS Guardian Opinion 
piece 
1st August  100 
28 VOTE LEAVE VICTORY! Official figures reveal UK billed MORE than £350m each week by EU Daily 
Express 
New article 2nd August  100 
29 Post-Brexit Sunderland_ 'If this money doesn't go to the NHS, I will go mad' Guardian News article 9th August  100 
20 
 
30 I will go mad!' Brexit voter DEMANDS money for the NHS as Britain waits for Article 50 Daily 
Express 
News article 11th August  100 
31 Nigel Farage says ambitious promises made by Brexit campaigners were 'mildly irresponsible'  Independent News article 14th 
September  
52 
32 Ex-health secretary Andrew Lansley demands £5bn-a-year ‘Brexit bonus’ for NHS Daily 
Express 
News article 22nd 
September  
16 
33 Brexit should give NHS an extra £5 billion EVERY YEAR, former health secretary claims Daily 
Express 
News article 22nd 
September  
25 
34 Boris Johnson ambushed with '£350m for NHS cheque Independent News article 4th October  31 
 
